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Abstract 
Seeking the upper bound of the efficiency loss in traffic assignment has attracted many scholars’ attentions in the last decade. 
The existing researches mainly focus on traffic assignment with fixed demand, few on user equilibrium (UE) assignment with 
elastic demand focus on single user. In this paper, the authors investigate the efficiency loss of multiclass traffic equilibrium 
assignment (MTEA) with elastic demand. Two decision making criteria are used in this traffic assignment problem, namely, 
time-based and monetary-based. The variational inequality (VI) models for MTEA under time-based decision criterion and 
monetary-based decision criterion are formulated. The efficiency loss caused by this two decision criterion is analytically derived 
and the relations to some network parameters are discussed. It is shown that the upper bound of efficiency loss caused by the 
time-based assignment depends on the type of link travel time function, the ratio of user benefit and the total social surplus under 
time-based at traffic equilibrium assignment state. The upper bound of efficiency loss caused by monetary-based assignment 
depends on the type of link travel time function, the value of time (VOT) of user classes, the ratio of user benefit and the total 
social surplus under monetary-based at traffic equilibrium assignment state, the ratio of user benefit at system optimum (SO) and 
the total social surplus at traffic equilibrium state under monetary –based. The numerical tests validate our analytical results. 
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1. Introduction 
The UE and the SO are two famous assignment principles regarding the users’ route choice behavior in traffic 
networks. Since the 1950s, it is well known that the outcome of the user’s selfish behavior is generally not identical 
with the SO. However, the gap between the SO and the UE in the worst case had been unknown for a long time. In 
the last decade, quantifying the efficiency loss of user’s behavior in the transportation network has been a prevalent 
topic in traffic science. Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) first introduced the efficiency loss or price of anarchy (POA) 
in traffic assignment and used it to quantify the difference between the UE and the SO, the POA is the worst 
possible ration between the total cost at UE and the SO.  After then, many researchers (Roughgarden and Tardos, 
2003; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2004; Correa et al. 2004; Huang et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2008) have extended the 
above work in different aspects. Recently, researchers investigated the efficiency loss of the equilibrium assignment 
in the stochastic circumstance ( Guo et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2009) and the mixed equilibrium traffic assignment (Liu 
et al., 2007; Han and Yang, 2009; Guo and Yang, 2009; Yu and Huang, 2010; Karakostas et al., 2011; Liu et al., 
2011). However, their researches are only subject to the traffic assignment with fixed demand. Up to now, few 
studies have been conducted to investigate the efficiency loss of traffic assignment with elastic demand. Chau and 
Sim (2003) extended Roughgarden and Tardos’s results to nonseparable but symmetric cost functions and proposed 
a bound with symmetric cost function and elastic demand. The POA in elastic demand is defined as the ratio 
between the maximum social surplus and the total surplus at user equilibrium. Han et al. (2008) derived several 
bounds for the POA of the noncooperative congestion games with elastic demands and asymmetric linear or 
nonlinear cost functions. Yang et al. (2010) examined the efficiency loss of a second-best congestion pricing scheme 
in general networks due to inexact marginal-cost pricing with either fixed or elastic demand. Karakostas and 
Kolliopoulous (2009) examined how to induce selfish heterogeneous users in a multicommodity network to reach an 
equilibrium that minimizes the social cost with elastic demand.  
This study focuses on the efficiency loss of the MTEA with elastic demand. First, this study formulates the VI 
models for this multiclass problem under time-based decision criterion and monetary-based decision criterion, 
respectively. Secondly, it derives the upper bounds of the inefficiency caused by the UE against the SO under the 
time-based and monetary-based, respectively. Then, the study examines the relationships between the bounds and 
the network parameters. Finally, it gives a simple numerical example. The value of this study lies in more 
understanding on complex route choice behavior and the consequences on system performance. 
2. MTEA model with elastic demand 
A transportation network  ,G N A  composed of a finite set of nodes N , and a finite set of directed links A . 
Let W  be the set of all Origin-Destination (OD) pairs, R  be the set of all paths in network and wR  be the set of all 
paths between OD pair w W . The travel demand can be subdivided into M  classes corresponding to groups of 
users with different values of time. Let 0mE !  be the average VOT of user class mˊLet mwq  be the demand of 
class m  between OD pair w W . Let  m mw wB q  be the inverse demand function for class m  on OD pair w W . Let 
m
av  be the flow of user class m  on link a A  and av  be the aggregate flow on link a A . The link travel time 
function  a at v  is a function of the flow av  on link a A  and assumed to be separable, differentiable, convex and 
monotonically increasing with the aggregate link flow av  . Let 
m
rwf  be the flow of class m  on path wr R . Let 
 ma ac v  be the actual travel cost of class m  on link a A , which is assumed to be a monotonically increasing 
function of the aggregate link flow av .  The flow of class m  on link a  can be expressed in terms of path flows, i.e,  
, , 1,2, ,
w
m m w
a rw ar
w W r R
v f a A m MG
 
    ¦ ¦ .                                             (1) 
where warG  1 if path wr R  traverses link a A  and zero otherwise and 
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1
, , 1,2, ,
M
m
a a
m
v v a A m M
 
    ¦ .                                               (2) 
The following constraints apply over the system: 
, , 1,2, ,
w
m m
rw w
r R
f q w W m M

    ¦ ,                                                  (3) 
 0, , , 1,2, ,mrw wf r R w W m Mt     ,                                                (4) 
0, , 1,2, ,mwq w W m Mt    .                                                      (5) 
Equations (3)-(5) can be written in matrix form as   ^ `| 0 0:  / t tf,q f = q,f ,q  , with f  the vector of path 
flows, /  the OD pair path incidence matrix and q  the vector of demand. A pair  f,q  will be said to be feasible if  :f,q , and the definitional constraints apply. Clearly, :  is a closed and convex set. 
Nagurney and Dong (2002) shown that the multiclass user equilibrium traffic assignment is equivalent to the 
following VI : 
Lemma 1 (Nagurney and Dong, 2002).  A multiclass path load, travel demand  , :f q  is traffic network 
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem,  
        
1 1
0, ,
w
M M
m m m m m m
rw rw rw w w w
w W r R m w W m
c f f B q q
     
   t  :¦ ¦¦ ¦¦f q f q .                    (6) 
where mrwc  is the actual travel cost of class m  on path wr R  and , , ,m m wrw a ar w
a A
c c r R w WG

   ¦          
1,2, ,m M .      
Under the time-based criterion, mac  is just the actual travel time cost, i.e., 
    , , 1,2, ,ma a a ac v t v a A m M   .                                                 (7) 
Comparably, under the monetary-based criterion, mac  is the VOT of user class m  times the actual travel time, i.e.  
                                        , , 1,2, ,ma a m a ac v t v a A m ME   .   (8) 
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6), respectively, and in view of (1) and (2), thus, the time-based VI model and 
monetary-based VI model can be respectively formulated as 
                           
1
0, ,
M
m m m
a a a w w w
a A w W m
t v v B q q
   
   t  :¦ ¦¦v q f q , (9) 
                      
1 1
0, ,
M M
m m m m m
m a a a m w w w
m a A w W m
t v v B q qE E
    
   t  :¦¦ ¦¦v q f q . (10) 
3. Bounding the efficiency loss under time-based 
Let  , :f q  be the solution of VI problem (9). Defined the total user benefit and social surplus under time-
based as    
0
1
, d
m
w
M q m
w
w W m
U B Z Z
  
 ¦¦³f q  and      0
1
d
m
w
M q m
w a a a
w W m a A
S B t v vZ Z
  
 ¦¦ ¦³f,q . Then, 
       a a a
a A
T t v v S U

   ¦f f,q f,q . Hence, the SO  ˆ ˆ, :f q  under time-based is defined as  
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ˆ ˆ arg max  S: f,qf,q f,q .                                                               (11) 
It is known that a non-unique set of user class link flows specified by the unique total link flow and unique 
demand as long as   0a at vcc !  of equation (11) (Clark et al, 2009; Wang and Huang, 2013). The total surplus at UE 
under time-based is  S f,q . Consequently, the efficiency loss for MTEA under time-based is defined as  
 
 
ˆ ˆ
t
ec
S
S
U  f,q
f,q
,                                                                     (12) 
Clearly, 1tecU t . 
Before studying the efficiency loss of MTEA under time-based, we give the lemma as follows 
Lemma 2˖If every  m mw wB q  is a nonincreasing function for 0mwq t ˈthen  
                               m mw wM Mq q
0 0
w W m=1 w W m=1 1
d d
M
m m m m m m
w w w w w w
w W m
B B B q q qZ Z Z Z
    
d  ¦¦ ¦¦ ¦¦³ ³ ˊ (13) 
Proof. Since  m mw wB q  is a nonincreasing function, it follows that 
                                   d , , 1,2, ,mwm
w
qm m m m m
w w w w wq
q q B q B w W m MZ Z t   ³ ˊ (14) 
i.e.,  
                                 
0 0
d d , , 1,2, ,
m m
w wq qm m m m m m
w w w w w wB B q q B q w W m MZ Z Z Zd     ³ ³ .        (15) 
Therefore, it completes the proof by summing up all the terms for all w W  and 1,2, ,m M . 
Theorem 1. For a given separable link travel time function class C , each instance  a at v  is a separable, 
differentiable, convex and monotonically increasing with the aggregate link flow av . Let  S f,q  and  ˆ ˆS f,q  be the 
total social surplus at UE and the maximum social surplus under time-based, respectively. Then,   
 
 
      
ˆ ˆ
1 1 γtec
S
C
S
U Z d  f,q f,q
f,q
.                                                    (16) 
where  
       , 0 0γ max maxa a a a a a a at C z v a a a
t z t v v
C
t z z t t
   
and 
    
 
   
0
1
0
1
d
1
d
m
w
m
w
M q m
w
w W m
M q m
w a a a
w W m a A
BU
S B t v v
Z Z
Z
Z Z
  
  
  t

¦¦³
¦¦ ¦³
f,q
f,q
f,q
. 
Proof:  Since  f,q  is a solution of the VI problem (9), then  
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1
0, ,
M
m m m
a a a w w w
a A w W m
t v v B q q
   
   t  :¦ ¦¦v q f q  
Combining this equality and (13) and rearranging terms, we have  
            
0 0
1 1
d d 0
m m
w w
M Mq qm m
w a a a w a a a a a a a a
w W m a A w W m a A a A
B t v v B t v v t v t v vZ Z Z Z
      
­ ½     t® ¾¯ ¿¦¦ ¦ ¦¦ ¦ ¦³ ³ .   (17) 
i.e.,  
       γ 0S S C T  tf,q f,q f .                                                (18) 
By the equation (12) and let    ˆ ˆ f,q f,q  in equation (18), then     1 γtec
T
C
S
U d  f
f,q
. Noticed that 
     ,T S U  f f,q f q ˈwe can obtain inequality (16) is right.  
4. Bounding the efficiency loss under monetary-based  
Let  , :f q  be the solution of VI problem (10). Defined the total user benefit under monetary-based as 
   
0
1
, d
m
w
M q m
m w
w W m
U BE Z Z
  
 ¦¦³f q  and social surplus under monetary-based as 
     
0
1 1
d
m
w
M Mq m m
m w m a a a
w W m a A m
S B v t vE Z Z E
    
 ¦¦ ¦¦³f,q .Then,        
1
M
m
m a a a
a A m
T v t v S UE
  
   ¦¦f f,q f,q . Hence, 
the SO  , :f q  under monetary-based is defined as  
     arg max  S: f,qf,q f,q .                                                             (19) 
It is known that unique total link flow as long as   0a at vcc !  and unique demand but possible multiple optima 
for individual user class link flows of equation (19) (Clark et al, 2009; Wang and Huang, 2013). The total surplus at 
UE under monetary-based is  S f,q . Consequently, the efficiency loss for MTEA under monetary-based is defined 
as  
 
 cec
S
S
U  f,q
f,q
,                                                                  (20) 
Clearly, 1cecU t . 
Before studying the efficiency loss of MTEA under monetary-based, we give the lemma as follows 
Lemma 3˖If every  m mw wB q  is a nonincreasing function for 0mwq t ˈthen  
                   
0 0
1 1 1
d d
m m
w w
M M Mq qm m m m m m
m w m w m w w w w
w W m w W m w W m
B B B q q qE Z Z E Z Z E
      
d  ¦¦ ¦¦ ¦¦³ ³ ˊ (21) 
Proof. Since  m mw wB q  is a nonincreasing function, it follows that 
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d , , 1,2, ,mwm
w
qm m m m m
w w w w wq
q q B q B w W m MZ Z t   ³ ˊ (22) 
For 0mE ! , thus   
     d , , 1,2, ,mwm
w
qm m m m m
m w w w w m wq
q q B q B w W m ME E Z Z t   ³ . 
i.e., 
       
0 0
d d , , 1,2, ,
m m
w wq qm m m m m m
m w m w m w w w wB B q q B q w W m ME Z Z E Z Z Ed     ³ ³ .      (23) 
Therefore, it completes the proof by summing up all the terms for all w W  and 1,2, ,m M . 
For each link travel time function  a a at t z , nonnegative link flow  0az t  and  the value of time 
, 1,2,m m ME  , define the following parameter: 
                 
 
    
0 1
1
1γ , , max
m
a
M
m
a a a m a a a a aM v mm
m a a a
m
z t v t z t v
z t z
E E
E t  
 
­ ½§ · ® ¾¨ ¸§ · © ¹¯ ¿¨ ¸© ¹
¦¦
. (24a) 
where by convention  0/0=0. For guarantee  γ , , 1a a az t E  , we further define 
                                  
1,
γ , sup max γ , ,
m
aa
a a a
vt C a A
z tE E
 
 C , (24b) 
where  ^ `1 | γ , , 1a a aA a A z t E   . Then define 
                                        γ , sup , ,
a
a a
t C
g z tE E

 C , (24c) 
and    
    
 1
1
0,
1
, , max
m
a
M
m
m a a a a a
m
a a Mv a A m
m a a a
m
v t z t v
g z t h x
v t v
E
E
E
 
t 
 

  
¦
¦
. As seen from (24c),  γ , 1E ! C . Moreover, 
  1h x o  when mav of  and  h x of  when 0mav o  for all 1,2, ,m M . 
From definition (24a), with av  and az  replaced by av  and av , respectively, we have 
                                        
1 1
γ , ,
M M
m m
m a a a a a a a a m a a a
m m
v t v t v v t v t vE E E
  
 d¦ ¦ . (25) 
Then, we can obtain 
 
    
         
       
1 1
1
1 1
γ C, γ C,
M
m
m a a a a a
a A m
M M
m m
m a a a a a m a a a a a
a A m a A m
v t v t v
v t v t v v t v t v
T T
E
E E
E E
  
    

   
d 
¦¦
¦¦ ¦¦
f f
              (26) 
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where the last inequity follows from the definition of (24b) and (24c) . 
We also define 
 
 
 
   
0
1
0
1 1
d,
d
m
w
m
w
M q m
m w
w W m
M Mq m m
m w m a a a
w W m a A m
BU
S B t v v
E Z Z
Z
E Z Z E
  
    
  

¦¦³
¦¦ ¦¦³
f q
f,q
.                             (27) 
and 
     
 
   
0
1
0
1 1
d,
d
m
w
m
w
M q m
m w
w W m
M Mq m m
m w m a a a
w W m a A m
BU
S B t v v
E Z Z
Z
E Z Z E
  
    
  

¦¦³
¦¦ ¦¦³
f q
f,q
f,q
.                    (28) 
Thus, we have the following theorem 
Theorem 2. For a given separable link travel time function class C , each instance  a at v  is a separable, 
differentiable, convex and monotonically increasing with the aggregate link flow av . Let  S f,q  and  S f,q  be the 
total social surplus at UE and the maximum social surplus under monetary-based, respectively. Then 
 
 
 
     
 
1 γ C, , 1 γ C,
1 γ C,
c
ec
S
S
E Z E ZU E
§ ·ª º  ¬ ¼¨ ¸ d ¨ ¸© ¹
f qf,q
f,q
.                                 (29) 
where      γ C, ,γ C, , , ,E E Z Z f q are defined by equations (24b),(24c),(27) and (28) above.  
Proof:  Since  f,q  is a solution of the VI problem (10), then  
       
1 1
0, ,
M M
m m m m m
m a a a m w w w
m a A w W m
t v v B q qE E
    
   t  :¦¦ ¦¦v q f q . 
Combining this equality and (21) and rearranging terms, we have  
       
0 0
1 1 1 1
d d
m m
w w
M M M Mq qm m m m
m w m a a a m w m a a a
w W m a A m w W m a A m
B t v v B t v vE Z Z E E Z Z E
        
­ ½  ® ¾¯ ¿¦¦ ¦¦ ¦¦ ¦¦³ ³  
    
1
0
M
m
m a a a a a
a A m
t v t v vE
  
  t¦¦ .                (30) 
Let     f,q f,q  in equation (30), then 
           γ C, γ C, 0S S T TE E   tf,q f,q f f .                              (31) 
Noticed that            , , ,T S U T S U     f f,q f q f f,q f q ˈwe can obtain inequality (29) is right. 
5. An efficiency loss  example of  MTEA with elastic demand 
Consider a directed graph consisting of five nodes and six directed links (see Fig.1). 
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0
1 2
3 4
a b
c d e r
 
Fig. 1. The network used in the example. 
 
The link travel time functions are given by          , , , ,a a a b b b c c c d d d e et v v t v v t v v t v v t v       
 ,e f f fv t v v .There are two classes of users with different values of time, Class 1 consists of users with a higher 
value of time of 3.0(RMB/min) (denoted by “1 ”) and class 2 consists of users with a lower value of time of 1.0 
(RMB/min) (denoted by “2”). There are two OD pair for each class, one is from node 0 to node 3 (denoted by “ 1w ”) 
and the other from node 0 to node 4 (denoted by “ 2w ”). The inverse demand function for each traveller class 
between each OD pair is 
1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1100 , 80 , 70 ,w w w w w wB q B q B q       2 22 260w wB q  . From OD pair 
1 1, ( , )w p a c ,  2 ,p b e , From OD pair  2 3 4, , ,w p a d p    ,b f . 
The equilibrium solution of  (9) is equivalent  to that of  (10), which is 
1 1
1 217.8125, 7.8125,p pf f    
   
2 2 3 3 4 4
1 2 1 2 1 217.8125, 7.8125, 9.0625, 4.0625, 9.0625, 4.0625p p p p p pf f f f f f       
1
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
26.875, 11.875, 26.875, 11.875, 17.8125, 7.8125,
9.0625, 4.0625, 17.8125, 7.8125, 9.0625, 4.0625,
38.75, 38.75, 25.625, 13.125, 25.625, 13.125,
35.
a a b b c c
d d e e f f
a b c d e f
w
v v v v v v
v v v v v v
v v v v v v
q
      
      
      
 
1 2 2
2 1 2625, 15.625, 18.125, 8.125.w w wq q q   
 
 
Then,    ( ) 953.9063, ( ) 5614.8, ( ) 5.8861, 2551.6, 13680, ( )S U S UZ Z      f,q f,q f,q f,q f,q f,q  5.3616. 
From (11), we can obtain the SO under time-based is 
1 1 2
1 2 112.6190, 2.6190, 12.6190,p p pf f f     
2 3 3 4 4
2 1 2 1 22.6190, 5.9524, 0.9524, 5.9524, 0.9524p p p p pf f f f f     .then,  ˆ ˆ 1945.2, 2.0392tecS U  f,q  .  From 
(19), we can obtain the SO under monetary-based is  
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 214.375, 0, 14.375, 0,p p p pf f f f      
3 3 4 4
1 2 1 26.875, 0, 6.875, 0p p p pf f f f    .Then,    5756.3, 9989.1, 3.9148, 2.2560cecS U Z U    f,q f,q . It is 
easily known that  γ 0.25C   for all the link travel time function in the example is linear link travel time function. 
Thus, the bound of efficiency loss under time-based becomes     2.0392 1 1 γ 2.2215tec CU Z d    f,q  
according to Theorem 1. 
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For  
 
    
0 1
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 and  a a at v v , we obtain that 
 
 
 22 0 1
1
1γ , , max
m
a
m
a a a m a a a
v mm
m a a a
m
z t v v v
v t v
E E
E t  
 
­ ½§ · ® ¾¨ ¸§ · © ¹¯ ¿¨ ¸© ¹
¦¦
 and 1 20.5 , 0a a a av v v v    is the solution of the above 
optimization problem, then       
3 0.5 38.75 38.75 0.5 38.75γ , ,
3 26.875 11.875 38.75a a a
v t E          0.3142 . By the same way, we 
obtain      γ , , 0.3142,γ , , =γ , , =0.3138,b a a c a a e a av t v t v tE E E               γ , , =γ , , 0.3150d a a f a av t v tE E  . Then, 
   γ , 0.3150,γ , 0C CE E  . Thus, the bound of efficency loss under monetary-based becomes 
     
 
1 γ C, , 1 γ C,
2.2560 2.3739
1 γ C,
c
ec
E Z E ZU E
§ ·ª º  ¬ ¼¨ ¸ d  ¨ ¸© ¹
f q
 according to Theorem 2. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the efficiency loss of the MTEA with elastic demand under time-based decision criterion 
and monetary-based decision criterion, respectively. It is shown that the upper bound of efficiency loss caused by the 
time-based assignment depends on the type of link travel time function, the ratio of user benefit and the total social 
surplus under time-based at traffic equilibrium assignment state. The upper bound of efficiency loss caused by 
monetary-based assignment depends on the type of link travel time function, the value of time of user classes, the 
ratio of user benefit and the total social surplus under monetary-based at traffic equilibrium assignment state, the 
ratio of user benefit at system optimum and the total social surplus at traffic equilibrium state under monetary-based 
criterion. The further research is to explore the efficiency loss of multiclass stochastic traffic equilibrium with elastic 
demand under different decision criteria. 
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